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Chapter 8
Investment Practices of State and
Local Pension Funds
Implications for Social Security Reform
Alicia H. Munnell and Annika Sunden
with the assistance of Cynthia Perry and Ryan Kling
The investment practices of public pension funds have become a topic of
major interest in the wake of President Clinton's 1999 proposal to invest a
portion of the Social Security Trust Funds in equities. Both supporters and
opponents of the proposal point to the performance ofpublic plans to argue
their case. Supporters cite the success offederal plans, particularly the Fed-
eral Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), which has avoided picking individual stocks
by investing in a stock index and has steered clear of projects with less than
market returns. Divestiture of stocks for social or political reasons has also
not been a problem, and TSP has avoided government intervention in the
private sector since individual portfolio managers vote the proxies. Oppo-
nents of Social Security Trust Fund investment in equities point to state and
local pension funds. They contend that state and local pensions often under-
take'investments that sacrifice return to achieve political or social goals, di-
vest stocks to demonstrate that they do not support some perceived immoral
or unethical behavior, and intervene in corporate activity. Opponents claim
that if social security's investment options were broadened, Congress would
use the trust fund money for similar unproductive activities. An important
question is the extent to which allegations about state and local plans are
true.
This study explores four possible avenues through which social or politi-
cal considerations could enter the investment decisions of state and local
pension funds. The first section focuses on economically targeted invest-
ments (ETIs), those investments that are designed to meet some special
need within the state. The second section looks at instances of pension fund
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activism, whereby the fund managers attempt to influence corporate behav-
ior to improve profitability or other aspects of corporate performance. The
third section investigates the extent to which state and local pension plans
have avoided or divested certain holdings in order to make a political or
ethical statement. The fourth section investigates the extent to which states
and localities have used pension funds as an escape valve for general budget
pressures.
This comprehensive review yields the following conclusions. First, eco-
nomically targeted investments account for no more than 2.5 percent of
total state and local holdings. Although early studies showed plans sacrific-
ing considerable return for targeting their investments to in-state activities,
recent survey data reveal no adverse impact on returns as a result of the cur-
rent small amount of ETI activity. Second, public plans in only three states
have seriously engaged in shareholder activism, and this activism appears
to have been motivated by a desire to improve the bottom line not to make
a political statement. The literature suggests that this activity has had a neg-
ligible to positive impact on returns. Third, the only significant divestiture
that has occurred was related to companies doing business in South Africa
before 1994. This was a unique situation where worldwide consensus among
industrial nations led to a global ban on investment in that country. With re-
spect to tobacco, public plans have generally resisted divestiture, and only a
few have actually sold their stock. Finally, state and local governments have
borrowed occasionally from their pension funds or reduced their contribu-
tions in the wake of budget pressures, but this activity has been restrained
by the courts and frequently reversed. In short, the story that emerges at the
state and local level is that while in the early 1980s some public plans sac-
rificed returns for social considerations, plan managers have become much
more sophisticated. Today, public plans appear to be performing as well as
private plans.
Economically Targeted Investments
State and local pension assets grew dramatically during the 1970s, and some
observers began to see these funds as a mechanism for achieving socially and
politically desirable objectives. Early debate focused on efforts to exclude
from pension portfolios companies with "undesirable" characteristics, such
as those facing labor problems or holding investments in South Africa. The
focus shifted in the 1980s, however, with the publication of two books favor-
ing investments that would foster social goals, such as economic develop-
ment and home ownership (Rifkin and Barber 1978, Litvak 1981).
At that time, advocates contended that these social goals could be
achieved without any loss of return. Early studies, however, suggested that
targeting did involve some financial sacrifice. For example, a survey of
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state-administered pension funds showed that ten states either inadvertently
or deliberately sacrificed return in an attempt to foster homeownership
(Munnell 1983). Analysis of the risk/return characteristics of the publicly or
privately insured mortgage-backed pass-through securities in those states
revealed that the sacrificed return sometimes exceeded 200 basis points.
Although mortgages accounted for only 5 percent of total state and local
assets, it seemed as ifstate and local pension funds were on a naIve and dan-
gerous path.
During this period, it appeared that public pension managers did not rec-
ognize the "Catch-22" nature of the exercise in which they were engaged.
The problem is that increasing in-state housing investment is inconsistent
with maximizing returns in the United States's highly developed capital mar-
kets. This is because any housing investment that offers a competitive re-
turn at an appropriate level of risk does not need special consideration by
public pension plans. Conversely, pension investments that would increase
the supply of housing funds must, by definition, either produce lower re-
turns or involve greater risk. Some sophisticated advocates of ETIs recog-
nized the efficiency of the market for housing finance and argued that pen-
sion funds could make a contribution through innovative forms of housing
finance (Litvak 1981). But that was not what was going on in 1983; rather the
in-state mortgages purchased by public pension funds tended to be conven-
tional fixed-rate thirty-year mortgages. The losses experienced in the early
1980s served as a sharp wake-up call to many public pension fund managers
who appeared to believe that they could accomplish social goals without
sacrificing returns.
In the last fifteen years, the rhetoric associated with targeted investments
has changed markedly. Public pension fund managers now acknowledge
the potential for losses and go out of their way to make clear that they are
no longer willing to sacrifice returns for social considerations. As discussed
below, almost every definition of ETIs includes a requirement that the in-
vestment produce a "market rate of return."
Current ETI Activity
Interviews with public pension plan officials in 1993 provide a state-by-state
description of past and current experiences with ETI programs and offer
a window on current thinking about economically targeted investing (Fer-
lauto and Claybourn 1993).\ The study's editors defined successful ETIs as
investments that produce risk-adjusted market rates and "provide excep-
tional corollary or external benefits by meeting specific capital gaps" (p. 4).
Since most investments yield some benefit to society, ETIs are expected to
produce exceptionally large benefits. The editors recognized that public
pensions can do little if markets are perfect, but contended that pension
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funds can improve the allocation of capital if gaps exist due to redlining,
discrimination, or the absence of a secondary market (as was the case for
mortgage loans before the advent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the
1960s).2
The Ferlauto and Claybourn study also points out that a successful ETI
program requires sensible investment selection procedures as well as a com-
mitment to market returns. They identify three practices as necessary for
success. First, state legislatures can authorize ETI activity, but they should
not be involved in picking specific investments; the latter decision must rest
with the retirement system. Second, ETIs cannot be considered in isola-
tion; they must be incorporated into an overall fund strategy ofgeographic
and asset diversification. Third, the retirement system must institute regu-
lar evaluations of ETI investments. They further suggest that those pension
funds that have followed these "best practices" - New York City Retirement
Systems, Massachusetts MASTERS, the Pennsylvania State System, and Cali-
fornia CalPERS-enjoyed solid subsequent performance.
Ferlauto and Claybourn report that some state and local plans that simply
targeted investments geographically or violated other guidelines ran into
serious trouble. For example, during the 1980s, the Alaska Retirement Sys-
tems invested $263 million in nonguaranteed home mortgages, 35 percent
of which were located in Alaska. When oil prices dropped dramatically in
1985, the Alaska real estate market crashed and more than one third ofthe
system's in-state loans became nonperforming. Similarly, the Kansas Public
Employees Retirement invested in a Kansas Savings & Loan that became in-
solvent and in an endangered steel mill that closed; the fund also lost tens of
millions on its nontargeted direct real estate investments. Kansas failed to
diversify its exposure by selecting a number of managers for private place-
ment lending and real estate investment; it also failed to limit its exposure
by coinvesting with banks, insurance companies, or other pension funds. In-
stead, Kansas loaned one-fifth of its private placement portfolio to a single
borrower, and it failed to provide oversight of its risky investments.
Although some plans suffered losses during the 1980s, state and local gov-
ernments learned from their mistakes. Alaska dropped its ETI program,
while Kansas expanded and diversified the fund's Board of Trustees, re-
quired investments through limited partnerships rather than direct lend-
ing, and removed its mandate for in-state investments. Concurrently, other
funds designed new programs and improved old programs. Some states
created financial intermediaries to identify, underwrite, package, and/or
credit-enhance targeted investments. Funds also started to package invest-
ments with guarantees and other risk sharing mechanisms in order to meet
risk/return benchmarks. They are also now using Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to securitize affordable home mortgage pools and state or federal gov-
ernment guarantees to back small business loans.
Investment Practices of State and Local Funds 157
TABLE 1. State and Local Pension Plans' Economically Targeted Investments, 1993
ETI activity
Fixed Income
Loans to small businesses
Private placements
Real estate
Construction loans
Residential mortgages
Commercial mortgages
Equity
Venture capital
Total
Source: Boice Dunham Group (1993).
Percent of total
21.6
4.5
17.0
69.3
4.5
50.6
12.5
1.7
9.1
100.0
Such innovations reduce the risk associated with ETls, but the necessity
to earn market returns and provide large collateral benefits must surely limit
the number of possible targeted investment opportunities. How much ETI
investing is going on? Three sources of information are available, each with
its own purpose and perspective on whether targeted investing is a good or
bad idea.
Perhaps the most comprehensive listing of ETI activity is a 1993 Boice
Dunham Group study, which was commissioned by Goldman Sachs. This
analysis defined an ETI as "an investment by a public pension fund which,
in addition to offering financial returns in proportion to financial risk, also
offers collateral local economic benefit (e.g., job creation, home owner-
ship)" (p. 1). Using this definition, Boice Dunham concluded that ETls ac-
counted for $17.5 billion or only 2 percent of the $887.3 billion of public
plan assets covered in their survey.3 ETI activity fell into three categories:
fixed income, real estate, and venture capital, with the majority going to
residential mortgages (see Table 1).
The second source of information on ETI activity is the General Account-
ing Office (1995), which reviewed a survey of 139 of the largest public pen-
sion plans. Fifty of the 119 respondents indicated that they had invested a
total of$19.8 billion in ETls to promote housing, real estate, or small busi-
ness development, which amounted to 2.4 percent oftotal respondents' as-
sets. Since the respondents accounted for 85 percent of the assets of state
and local plans, these results are broadly representative.
Another source on ETls is the set of files known as PENDAT, which were
created from the Surveys of State and Local Employee Retirement Systems
for Members of the Public Pension Coordinating Council (Zorn 1991, 1993,
1995, 1997). (These data are also the basis for our empirical analysis pre-
sented below). The question included in these surveys has varied slightly
over time, but generally asks "What percentage of the portfolio is directed
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in-state for developmental purposes?"4 The emphasis on "developmental
purposes" could easily lead respondents to omit residential mortgages made
at market rates and private placements-the two largest categories in the
Boice Dunham study. As a result, the percentage of total assets designated
for in-state investment averaged between 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent over
the four surveys.
Two conclusions emerge from this review of the extent and nature ofETI
activity in the 1990s. First, ETls account for only a small portion of the as-
sets of state and local pension funds.5 Second, in the wake of early failures
pension fund managers have set up procedures to ensure market returns for
given levels of risk and to protect themselves from major losses. The ques-
tion remains, however, whether the new procedures have prevented ETls
from adversely affecting returns. This issue can only be resolved empirically.
The Impact of ETls on Pension Fund Returns
The most comprehensive data available on state and local plans come from
the PENDAT files described above. This periodic survey includes informa-
tion on system administration, investment behavior, reporting practices,
benefits, and actuarial methods and assumptions. Reports regarding public
plan attributes in the previous year were published in 1991,1992,1993,1995,
and 1997. Sample sizes and response rates vary somewhat by year, but gen-
erally include most plan participants and public plan assets. For example,
in 1997, 261 retirement systems covering a total of 379 plans responded to
the survey, representing about 80 percent ofstate and local plan active par-
ticipants and assets (Zorn 1997).
Here we use the PENDAT data to explore whether ETI activity has a sig-
nificant effect on the economic performance of public pension plans. We
measure performance two ways: as the annual rate of return over the pre-
ceding year and as the average rate of return over the last five years. The
explanatory variables we use fall into four groups. The first concerns in-
vestment strategies. This includes whether the fund engages in ETI activity,
whether the state constitution imposes investment restrictions, and whether
the fund prohibits investments in certain companies (such as tobacco firms).
The expected coefficients for these variables are negative, since including
criteria other than risk and return diminishes the possibility of an efficient
portfolio.
The second group of variables we examine reflects public plan portfolio
composition and size. These would be expected to have a positive effect on
performance; stocks have higher returns, and large funds tend to be more
efficient. The third group of factors concerns management practices, and
are expected to have mixed effects: outside evaluation would be expected
to increase returns by improving the quality of investment decisions; admin-
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istrative expenses paid by the fund would be expected to reduce returns;
and corporate governance activity (asked only in 1997), generally directed
toward underperforming firms, would be expected to enhance the perfor-
mance of the fund. Finally, we look at the impact of the percentage of the
board elected by pension plan membership, and anticipate that the effect
could go either way.6 A summary of the dependent and explanatory variables
appears in Table 2.
The results of the multivariate analysis ofstate and local pension plan per-
formance for the individual years and for the pooled data are presented in
Table 3. The ETI variable (INSTATE), which reflects the share of the port-
folio directed in-state for developmental purposes, does not have a statisti-
cally significant effect on fund performance either in the pooled data or in
any of the individual years.' Separate estimates using an indicator variable
for ETIs also suggest that this activity does not have a significant effect on
overall performance (Appendix Table 1). Finally, estimates using the more
comprehensive Goldman Sachs information on ETIs yield the same results
(Appendix Table 2).
With regard to the other variables in the equation, the only ones that con-
sistently have a statistically significant effect on returns are portfolio com-
position and size. The share of assets invested in equities has a significant
positive effect on fund performance both in the short run and the long run.
Large systems are likely to be more efficient in the management and admin-
istration of the plan and appear to earn higher returns. Neither the man-
agement and reporting practices nor board composition variables have a
systematic effect on investment return.
The fact that we fail to find a negative effect of ETIs on returns appears to
contradict some prior studies showing a strong and large negative relation-
ship between ETI activity and pension fund earnings.s Yet on closer exami-
nation, we believe the story is consistent: ETIs are a small part of pension
portfolios, managers aim for market returns, and therefore ETI activity does
not have a noticeable impact on public plan investment outcomes.
One often-cited study is by Romano (1993), who provides an extensive
description of the political pressures on public pension funds' investment
practices and an empirical analysis of the relationship between political in-
fluence and public pension performance.To explain performance, Romano
included the following variables: the proportion of the board elected by
fund members, three measures of social investing (preference for in-state
investment, active in corporate governance, and restrictions on investments
of companies doing business in South Africa), and the proportion of as-
sets in nongovernment securities. Her data were for 50 state pension funds
over the five-year period 1985-89. She found that the two variables with
statistically significant coefficients are the proportion of assets in nongov-
ernment securities and the South Africa variable.9 The two other social in-
160 AJicia H. Munnell and Annlka Sunden
TABLE 2. Variable Definitions and Means of Characteristics of State and Local
Pension Plans
Mean
Variable Definition 1991 1993 1995 1997
Investment strategies
INSTATE Percent of pension fund assets 0.35 0.30 0.37 0.10
invested in state
RESTRICT Investment restriction specified 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.16
in constitution
SOUTH AFRICA Prohibitions against invest- 0.45 0.48 0.19 0.13
ments of specific types
Portfolio composition
EQUITY% Percent of assets invested in 35.80 43.26 49.24 53.11
equities
SIZE Mean assets in the pension fund 2.98 3.16 4.88 6.07
($billion)
Management practices
OUTEVAL System obtains independent 0.78 0.81 0.87 0.92
investment performance
evaluation
ADINVST Administrative expenses offset 0.54 0.55 0.60 0.63
by investment income
PROXY System has actively participated 0.22
in corporate governance
Board composition
ELCTMEMB Percentage of board elected by 34.73 31.60 35.43 32.84
pension membership
Rate ofreturn
ROR90 Rate of return on the pension 7.89
fund received on assets in
1990
ROR92 Rate of return on the pension 9.33
fund received on assets in
1992
ROR94 Rate of return on the pension 1.55
fund received on assets in
1994
ROR96 Rate of return on the pension 13.72
fund received on assets in
1996
RORAVG Average rate of return on assets 11.53 10.99 8.80 11.29
for previous five years
Source: Authors' calculations using PENDAT (see Zorn 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997).
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vesting variables-preference for in-state investments and corporate gover-
nance-never had a statistically significant effect on returns at conventional
significance levels. Board composition, the variable of greatest interest to
the author, was only marginally significant.
Even these modest results should be interpreted cautiously, because the
author provided no indication about the extent to which her sample of pen-
sion funds represented the broader universe of state and local plans. Also,
her dependent variable-earnings on investments "including realized capi-
tal gains," divided by book value of total assets-is, in our view, an inade-
quate measure ofperformance. The numerator does not include unrealized
gains, which were probably important given the increased holdings of equi-
ties and the strong stock market performance in the late 1980s, and the
denominator can be manipulated-that is, it can be increased or reduced
through the purchase or sale of assets.
Mitchell and Hsin (1997) explored the impact of ETIs on investment re-
turns using the 1991 PENDAT data. They related the rate of return on pen-
sion assets to the pension board composition, board management practices,
reporting requirements, and investment practices-including a variable for
the percent of plan assets devoted to in-state investments. The coefficient of
the "in-state" variable was not statistically significant when the plan returns
were averaged over the previous five years, but it was significant (at the 10
percent level) when the dependent variable was the return for 1991 only.The
results suggest that in 1991 every percentage point of plan assets targeted
to in-state investments cost public pension funds eight basis points.1O
Even though we use the same data as Mitchell-Hsin, we do not duplicate
their findings. Our 1991 equation shows a statistically significant positive co-
efficient on ETIs when returns were averaged over five years and an insignifi-
cant coefficient for the annual return. Because our results are anomalous
on theoretical grounds and not consistent with the pattern in later years, we
argue that they should be dismissed. The difference in the two studies arises
because Mitchell-Hsin imputed missing values and we did notY
The ETI controversy was recently joined by Nofsinger (1998), who claims
that ETI activity reduces public pension fund returns by 200 basis points.
This claim comes from an empirical model that relates abnormal returns
(the dependent variable) to four variables reflecting ETI activity, asset-allo-
cation limitations, social restrictions, and the prudent-person rule. The au-
thor estimates this model separately for each of the three years using 1991,
1992, and 1993 PENDAT data, and also a model that pools the three years'
data and adds three additional variables: the percentage of board mem-
bers elected by plan participants, the natural log of assets, and percentage
of the portfolio in equities. The results for the ETI variable are mixed. In
the year-specific regressions, the ETI variable is negative but not statistically
significant from zero. In the pooled data, the ETI variable is negative (at
about -200 basis points) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
TABLE 3. Multivariate Analysis of Rate of Return of State and Local Pension Plans
1991 1993 1995 1997 Pooled
ROR90 RORAVG ROR92 RORAVG ROR94 RORAVG ROR96 RORAVG RORCUR RORAVG
Management strategies
INSTATE -0.31 0.34** -0.07 0.39 -0.05 0.01 0.35 0.06 -0.12 0.182
(0.26) (0.13) (0.15) (0.61) (0.21) (0.07) (0.31 ) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12)
RESTRICT 1.25 1.13 ** 0.67 0.86** 0.09 0.49 -0.64 -0.19 0.56 0.63**
(1.00) (0.52) (0.50) (0.40) (0.79) (0.27) (0.62) (0.35) (0.37) (0.23)
SOUTH AFRICA -0.60 0.07 -0.92 0.16 -0.54 -0.45 1.14 0.35 -0.45 -om
(0.82) (0.42) (0.43) (0.36) (0.82) (0.29) (0.67) (0.38) (0.35) (0.20)
Portfolio composition and size
EQUITY% 0.02 0.00 -om 0.03** -0.05** 0.01 0.16* 0.07** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
SIZE -0.05 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.08 0.21 ** 0.12** om 0.07**
(0.18) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Management and reporting practices
OUTEVAL -2.35** -0.11 1.31 ** -0.16 -1.23 0.12 -2.75** -0.94 -0.92 -0.10
(1.03) (0.56) (0.60) (0.56) (1.02) (0.34) (0.82) (0.51) (0.49) (0.26)
ADINVST -0.71 -0.85** 0.25 0.23 -0.92 -0.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.21 -0.19
(0.81) (0.43) (0.43) (0.35) (0.65) (0.22) (0.45) (0.25) (0.29) (0.16)
PROXY - - - - - - -0.29 -0.25
(0.58) (0.32)
Board composition
ELCTMEMB -0.03* -0.02** -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Year
YEAR91 -5.32** 0.54**
(0.57) (0.23)
YEAR93 -4.10** -0.19
(0.42) (0.24)
YEAR95 -12.11** -2.54**
(0.43) (0.18)
CONSTANT 11.48** 10.77** 10.87** 10.17** 4.75 6.91 ** 3.06 5.87** 12.89** 8.68**
(3.62) (1.89) (1.84) (2.02) (2.97) (1.12) (2.03) (1.13) (1.42) (0.81)
R2 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.50 0.41 0.55 0.41
Number of Observations 155 132 220 123 144 120 166 156 697 390
Source: Authors' calculations using PENDAT (see Zorn 199], ]993, 1995, 1997).
"Size" variable is measured as the natural log of assets. Standard errors in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The question is how to interpret these results. One conclusion is that the
pooled estimate is implausibly large, given that the average return for funds
in the sample is 10 percent and that those plans that do engage in ETI ac-
tivity hold only 5 percent of their portfolio in such investments. For plans
with ETls to suffer a reduction of 200 basis points in their overall returns,
they would have to average a 300 percent loss on their ETI investments. The
author acknowledges that the effect is too large to attribute to ETls and must
be picking up the effect of some other unobserved variable that negatively
affects returns. A second empirical concern is that the ETI effect is not con-
sistent in the annual versus the pooled data. Our third concern is that the
author limits his sample to pension funds that have the necessary data in all
three years, which reduces the number of plans in his sample to fifty-six (the
original sample of defined benefit plans was 173 in 1991,280 in 1992, and
260 in 1993). This is troubling because the reduced sample may not be rep-
resentative, and the results are sensitive to outliers.J2 To test the robustness
of Nofsinger's results, we reestimated his model using the entire PENDAT
sample for individual years (1991, 1992, and 1993), then with pooled data
for those three years, then for 1995 and 1997 individually, and finally with
pooled data for all five years available. Our results show that the coefficient
of ETI activity does not have a statistically significant coefficient in any of
the modelsP
Our conclusion from this review of ETI activity is that the world has
changed since the late 1970s and early 1980s when activists first turned their
attention to state and local pension funds. At that time, targeted investing-
particularly in the form of in-state mortgages - was associated with lower re-
turns for a given level of risk. Moreover, during the 1980s, a few public plans,
such as Kansas, Alaska, and others, suffered large losses, that subjected pub-
lic plan investments to increased scrutiny. As a consequence, public plan
investment practices became more sophisticated; ETls were redefined as in-
vestments that pay market returns and provide opportunities for collateral
benefits. The extent to which such opportunities exist today is open to ques-
tion, but this survey shows that very few state and local pension assets are
invested in ETls-not more than 2.5 percent. Also, the empirical evidence
indicates that ETls do not have a significant impact on pension fund returns.
This conclusion is reinforced by the results of two new studies recently
commissioned by CalPERS (California Public Employees Retirement Sys-
tem 1999). Although it is unclear how representative the samples are, both
studies suggest that public pension plans are performing about as well as
private plans. Wilshire Associates, a California-based pension investment
consultant, found no systematic difference in the investment performance
of 50 large corporate and 50 large public plans (with total assets of $870
billion combined) (Wilshire Associates 1999). Annualized returns ending
September 1998, net of fees and expenses, are shown in Table 4. Private
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TABLE 4. Annualized Returns on Public and Private Pension Assets (%)
I. Median total fund returns
Corporate pension funds
Public pension funds
2. Median U.S. equity returns
Corporate pension funds
Public pension funds
Five years
12.3
11.4
16.6
16.5
Ten years
12.4
11.6
15.4
15.6
pension funds had a I-percentage point higher return over both reporting
periods, but this was attributable entirely to their relatively greater hold-
ings of (riskier) stocks. When stock investments were examined separately,
the results showed that corporate pension equity portfolios returned 0.1
percentage point per year more than public pension equity portfolios over
five years, but 0.2 percentage points less over ten years. Further, using a
regression-based methodology to control for risk, Wilshire found that the
median public pension plan actually exhibited a higher risk-adjusted return
than did the median private pension plan.
The second study by Cost Effectiveness Management Inc. (CEM) (Am-
bachtsheer, Halim, and Scheibelhut 1999) reported similar results. The firm
analyzed four years of data (1994-97) for 51 corporate ($325 billion) and
thirty-four public ($632 billion) pension plans. Again, the finding was that
corporate plans have a slightly higher average gross return than public funds
over the period (14.6 percent versus 13.4 percent), but this reflected greater
equity holdings by corporate plans as compared to public plans (63 percent
versus 52 percent). A separate analysis of the performance in large-cap U.S.
stocks showed nearly identical performance (21.35 percent for corporate
plans versus 21.10 percent for public plans). CEM concluded that the type
of sponsorship of the fund is not what drove fund performance. The factors
that mattered were the size of the plan (economies of scale and a full-time
manager), the proportion of plan assets passively managed, and good gover-
nance structures with a clear mission. These characteristics appeared to be
equally prevalent in the public and private sectors-at least in those plans
included in the Wilshire and Cost Effectiveness Management samples.
Shareholder Activism
The most recent avenue through which politics might enter public pen-
sion fund investing is shareholder activities-that is, public plans using the
ownership rights associated with their equity holdings to influence the be-
havior of individual firms. Two comments are relevant before describing ac-
tivity in this area. First, all proposals to invest the Social SecurityTrust Funds
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in equities require that voting rights be given to the asset managers, not
voted at all, or voted in the same fashion as the other shareholders, which
is equivalent to not voting at all. Thus, the voting issue would not arise at
the federal level. Second, assuming that improving profitability-not poli-
tics-is the motivation for pension fund intervention in corporate activity,
the expected effect on returns is positive, not negative.
The Nature of Shareholder Activism
Shareholder proposals are most frequently directed at companies that
under-perform their peers (Nesbitt 1994; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling
1996).14 They typically focus on three types of issues: altering the structure
of Board governance (eliminating staggered board terms, separating the
positions of CEO and chairman of the board, or creating a compensation
committee entirely composed of independent Board members); removing
takeover defenses provisions (eliminating or weakening a company's poison
pill); or changing voting procedures (making shareholder votes confidential
or adopting cumulative voting procedures for directors). With one excep-
tion, shareholder proposals are only advisory under state law.15 This means
that even if a proposal passes with a majority of votes, management is not
required to take the requested action.
In terms of the mechanics, most shareholder activism involves submitting
proposals under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14
a-8. This rule permits shareholders to include a proposal and a 500-word
supporting statement in the proxy distributed by the company for its an-
nual shareholder meeting (Black 1998). This SEC rule allows shareholders
to avoid the expense of preparing their own proxy statements and soliciting
their own proxies. Keeping costs down is important because even the most
activist institutions spend less than half a basis point of assets under man-
agement on governance efforts (Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999).16 While
Rule 14 a-8 minimizes costs, it can be used to address only limited subjects.
Most importantly, it cannot be used to nominate candidates for the board
of directors.
Of the 437 shareholder proposals submitted to companies in 1998, institu-
tional investors accounted for 42 percent; individuals accounted for the rest
(IRRC 1998f). Of the institutional investors, labor unions were the biggest
players (15 percent of the total), followed by money managers (12 percent),
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (8 percent), and public
pension plans (6 percent). In the case of public plans, three states-Califor-
nia, NewYork, and Wisconsin -were responsible for most of the activity. The
only other participant was the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF),
which is a retirement system used by university and research employees in
both the public and the private sector (see Table 5).
Investment Practices of State and Local Funds 167
TABLE 5. Prevalence of Corporate Governance Shareholder Proposals for Public
Pension Plans in 1998
Proposal sponsor
Individuals
Unions
Other institutional investors
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility
Public plans
College Retirement Equities Fund
California Public Employees Retirement System
New York City Employees' Retirement System
New York City Fire
New York City Police
New York City Teachers
State of Wisconsin Investment Board
Total
Number ofproposals
257
67
52
33
28
2
5
7
3
4
4
3
437
Source: IRRC Corporate Governance Bulletin (l998f).
Note: Two proposals sponsored by churches are included in the 257 proposals sponsored by
"individuals."
In the United States, shareholder activism by institutional investors began
in the late 1980sP A key feature of large U.S. corporations is the separation
of ownership from control- that is, the shareholders own the firm, but the
managers run it. This separation creates an agency problem in that man-
agers may run the firm in their own interests, rather than in the interests
of shareholders. In the early 1980s, corporate takeovers provided a mea-
sure of discipline by threatening to replace the management of poorly per-
forming firms. With the reemergence of state antitakeover laws and poison
pills over the late 1980s, institutional investors concerned about corporate
performance turned to alternative means to discipline firms. Shareholder
proposals then became a way to address the shareholder-manager agency
conflict and to pressure managers to adopt value-enhancing changes (Pozen
1994).
Some critics charge that public pension plans cannot effectively carry out
this disciplining task, contending that such plans confront pressure to take
politically popular positions that actually hurt firm performance (Romano
1993). Others suggest that public pension plan managers do not face the
right incentives to maximize shareholder value. As a result, such managers
may use the proposals to generate publicity or enhance their reputations for
future employment, rather than to enhance the value of the firm (Murphy
and Van Nuys 1994). Thus, the empirical question is whether activism has
produced any demonstrable results, and whether these results have been
positive or negative.
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Impact of Shareholder Activism on Company Performance 1B
Answering this question turns out to be quite difficult. One reason is that
the effect of activism may be buried in the noise associated with other fac-
tors affecting firm profitability. Our results using the PENDAT data showed
that shareholder activism had no significant effect on returns in 1997.19 Most
of the other studies also reveal no correlation, although there are a few ex-
ceptions.20 Nesbitt (1994) documented a rebound in the performance of
firms targeted by CaIPERS, but it is not clear whether this rebound was a
result of the activism or merely a reversion to the mean in stock price re-
turns. Opler and Sokobin (1997) examined the "focus list" of the Council
of Institutional Investors and found a significant above-average return in
the year after targeting and no mean reversion in their control sample, al-
though other studies did find mean reversion among poorly performing
firms.
A different strategy seeks to document abnormal returns around the date
when a formal shareholder proposal is announced. Here no obvious pattern
emerges, perhaps for several reasons.21 One is that it is not clear what an
"event" means. For example, a formal shareholder proposal could be the
result of management's inflexibility, whereas successful informal negotia-
tions could indicate that management responded to shareholder interests.
Also, considerable uncertainty surrounds the "event" date, because share-
holder proposals are often discussed informally prior to formal announce-
ment (Black 1998).
Yet another strand in the research literature explores the relationship be-
tween activism and discrete corporate events, such as CEO turnover, asset
sales, or spin-offs. Earlier studies produced mixed results, but Del Guer-
cio and Hawkins (1999) criticized these efforts for failing to account for
the heterogeneity in investment strategies among different funds and the
impact of these strategies on efforts to affect corporate governance.22 For
example, since the CaIPERS, California State Teachers Retirement System
(CaISTERS), and the New York City Funds (NYC) rely on indexing and out-
side managers, they cannot walk away if they do not like the performance
ofa particular stock. Therefore, these plans are interested in improving the
overall performance of the market; as a result they pursue more generic
topics, such as confidential voting, and are happy to make their moves very
public, since they want spillover effects. In contrast, CREF is 80 percent in-
dexed but actively manages the remainder of the assets, and the State of
Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) is internally managed and actively en-
gaged in stock picking. These latter plans tend to have narrow firm-specific
goals, such as eliminating poison pills, and they generally try to avoid pub-
licity, since they can make money by buying a stock before they target a
company and earn a gain from the effort. Taking account of the heteroge-
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neity in strategies, Del Guercio and Hawkins find that targeted companies
experience more asset sales, restructuring, spin-offs, and employee layoffs
during the next three years than a control sample.
One problem in this type of analysis, however, is that targeted firms are
generally poor performers, and poor performers are more likely to experi-
ence turnover in top management or a takeover than strong performers.
Hence, it is necessary to use a control group of equally poor performers
in the same industry. If the researchers use a less sophisticated measure to
select the control group than institutions use to target firms, the study could
produce a spurious correlation between activism and the governance event
(Black 1998).
The conclusion that emerges from the review of the empirical literature
is that some studies have found a positive relationship between shareholder
activism and firm performance, but the results are still far from robust. Per-
haps this should be expected given that funds do not spend very much on
this activity, do not act jointly, do not conduct proxy fights, and do not try
to elect their own candidates to the board of directors.23 Alternatively, indi-
vidual firm data may not be the place to look for success; the impact of
shareholder activism may emerge in the form of changing corporate cul-
ture. For example, shareholders rarely persuade companies with staggered
boards to repeal their provisions, but few companies are making new stag-
gered board proposals because their chances ofsuccess are low (Del Guerico
and Hawkins 1999).
It is important to reiterate two points before turning to the topic of di-
vestiture. First, the debate with regard to shareholder activism is generally
about the magnitude of the positive response from this form of activity, not
concern about fund losses. Second, with regard to the social security debate,
the issue would not arise at all; all proposals to invest the trust fund in equi-
ties require that the proxy voting be undertaken by the individual portfolio
managers or not used at all.
Divestiture
It is sometimes argued that public pension plans face pressure to sell assets
for political reasons, an issue known as "divestiture." In practice, divestiture
has been a one-issue phenomenon, focused on South Mrica investments
during the apartheid period. Beyond South Africa, politics has not led to
divestiture; issues raised in some states by Northern Ireland generally have
been resolved by companies promising to adhere to human rights principles
not by funds selling stock. Public plans have generally resisted divestiture
of tobacco stocks, and to the extent that divestiture has occurred, it has re-
sponded to concern about risk-adjusted returns rather than social consider-
ations.
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The Issues
Divestiture issues have arisen in three cases: South Mrica, Northern Ire-
land, and tobacco.
South Africa. As opposition against the South Mrican government apart-
heid policy increased during the 1970s, social activists charged that com-
panies investing in South Africa indirectly supported the government and
its discrimination policies. In an initial effort to resolve the conflict, the
Reverend Leon Sullivan in 1977 introduced a set of guidelines for compa-
nies doing business in South Mrica, the so-called "Sullivan principles," that
called for nonsegregation of races and equal pay for equal work. However,
many felt that the Sullivan principles did not go far enough, and in the wake
of the continued controversy, Reverend Sullivan called in 1987 for compa-
nies to withdraw completely from South Mrica.
During this period, the majority of public pension plans put restrictions
on or divested their South Mrica holdings (Romano 1993). For example,
California banned investment in South Mrica in 1986, giving the pension
plans four years to unload their investments. By the end of 1990, the plans
had sold $11 billion in stocks and bonds, representing about 10 percent of
the portfolio (Schnitt 1994). New Jersey banned investments in 1985 and
sold $4 billion or 15 percent of its total holdings (Price and Schramm 1991).
In 1993, as the apartheid government started unraveling, Mrican Na-
tional Congress President Nelson Mandela urged international investors to
lift their sanctions. State and local governments and public pension plans
quickly responded. New York City's retirement system, one of the coun-
try's largest plans managing $48 billion in assets, dropped restrictive legis-
lation the following month (Fortune 1993). California lifted its ban in early
1994, and CalPERS immediately bought $1 billion worth of stock previously
barred (Schnitt 1994). Within a few months, a majority offunds had elimi-
nated their policies against investment in South Mrica and started to invest
in companies previously not available.
Northern Ireland. All references to South Mrica have been eliminated from
state law; the only country currently cited with any frequency is Northern
Ireland.24 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have expressed con-
cerns about the discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland in
their state laws. The state laws and pension board policies regarding North-
ern Ireland generally do not prohibit investment or call for divestiture. In-
stead, states have required companies doing business in Northern Ireland
to sign onto the "MacBride principles," a set of policies aimed at eliminating
religious discrimination (Appendix Table 3).
Tobacco. In the 1990s, attention turned to tobacco companies. In view of
pending lawsuits against tobacco companies, investigation of tobacco ad-
vertising, and antismoking campaigns, pension funds have faced increased
pressure from lawmakers and regulators to sell their tobacco stocks. Some
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proponents of divestiture base their case on social philosophy; but most ar-
gue that pending litigation against tobacco companies and possible legisla-
tion have made investing in tobacco stock much riskier.
Among institutional investors, interest in divestiture of tobacco stocks was
originally based on health and moral issues. The first wave of divestitures
occurred in the mid-1980s when several public health associations, founda-
tions, and religious organizations sold their tobacco holdings citing ethical
conflicts. The second wave of tobacco divestitures, which involved univer-
sity endowments, occurred in the early 1990s. Among private pension plans,
CREF created a tobacco-free account in 1990 but has not divested any to-
bacco stock so far (Investor Responsibility Research Center 1997a).
It was only when the financial risk associated with tobacco holdings was
perceived to have increased markedly that states began to advocate divesti-
ture.25 So far, although several states have proposed banning investments
in tobacco stocks, only one state-Massachusetts-has done SO.26 In other
states, when state lawmakers have proposed divestiture bills, they have gen-
erally been met with strong opposition from the pension plans. For ex-
ample, in California, CalPERS forcefully opposed divestiture, arguing that
any form of divestiture contradicts a passively managed long-term index
strategy (Los Angeles Times 1998).27
Table 6 summarizes the current policy on tobacco investments by pub-
lic plans. In addition to the Massachusetts state legislation, public plans in
eight other states have introduced their own restrictions on tobacco hold-
ings. In some cases, these restrictions have required plans to divest; in other
cases, pension funds have kept their current tobacco stock but put restric-
tions on future investments. Overall public pension plans have sold only be-
tween 5 percent and 10 percent of their tobacco holdings (Narayan 1997;
Investor Responsibility Research Center 1997a, b, c, d, e, f, 1998). The big-
gest divestiture occurred in Florida, where the pension system in 1997 sold
all its-tobacco holdings valued at $835 million, this sale alone accounts for
more than two-thirds of public pension plans' total divestiture of tobacco
stocks (Investor Responsibility Research Center 1997f).
The Impact of Divestiture on Pension Fund Returns
Investment policies that include selecting assets based on criteria other than
risk and return have a negative effect on expected risk-adjusted returns,
since restricting the selection of stocks makes it more difficult to eliminate
systematic risk through diversification.
South Africa. The experience with divestiture of companies doing business
in South Africa turned out to be different in practice than in theory because
of some unique circumstances. During the early 1980s, South Africa-free
portfolios actually performed better than nondivested portfolios (Gross-
man and Sharpe 1986; Angelis 1998). Because companies with South Africa
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TABLE 6. Investment Policies in Tobacco Stock of State and Local Pension Plans
State
Investment policy by state law
Massachusetts
Pension plan
Investment policy by pension board
Denver Employee Retirement
Program
Florida State Retirement Trust Fund
Maryland State Retirement and
Pension Systems
Minnesota State Board of
Investments
New York State Teachers'
Retirement System
New York State Common
Retirement Fund
New York City Employees'
Retirement System
Pennsylvania Public School
Employees' Retirement System
Philadelphia Municipal Pension
Fund
San Francisco City and County
Employees' Retirement System
Vermont State Employees' Retire-
ment System and Vermont State
Teachers' Retirement System
Law
Must divest tobacco holdings within
three years; local pension boards
exempt from divestment require-
ments but cannot buy additional
tobacco stock
Policy
Divest holdings of tobacco
Divest all holdings of tobacco
Sold all tobacco stock but retains
right to purchase tobacco stock at
future date
Froze tobacco holdings in actively
managed accounts; no restric-
tions on tobacco holdings in
index funds
Underweight tobacco in index fund
by 25 percent
Froze future investments of tobacco
stock in actively managed funds;
no restriction on investments in
tobacco stocks in the indexed
portion of the portfolio
Froze tobacco investments in index
funds; no restrictions on actively
managed accounts but money
managers have been advised to
"use caution" when considering
future tobacco investments
Froze tobacco investments
Divested tobacco stock
Voted to divest tobacco holdings;
sold holdings in index fund.
Divested tobacco stock
Year
1997
Year
1996
1997
1996
1998
1996
1996
1998
1997
1997
1998
1997
Source: Derived from Social Investment Forum (1998) and IRRC Investor's Tobacco Reporter
(1997a, b, c, 1998a, b, c, d, e).
Some smaller city plans have also divested their tobacco stock: Boston, Mass., 1997; Burlington,
VI., 1997; Cambridge, Mass., Retirement Systems, 1990, and Fulton County, Ga., 1994.
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ties were large companies, the divestiture created a bias toward small capi-
talization stocks. During this period, small cap firms returned a premium
over their risk-adjusted returns, resulting in overall better returns for the
divested portfolios (Grossman and Sharpe 1986).
For the late 1980s, the story is more mixed. For the five-year period 1985-
89, the S&P 500 including South Mrica stocks performed slightly better
than the South Mrica-free version of the index (Pensions and Investments
Age 1989). Using data on a subset of public pension plans, Romano (1993)
found that restrictions on South Mrica investments had a small but statisti-
--'
cally significant negative effect on returns for the same time period. Another
study by a consulting firm, the Brian Rom Corporation, shows that portfo-
lios without South Mrica stock ties performed somewhat better than those
portfolios with South Mrica stock over the same time period (Pensions and
Investments Age October 1989). However, the authors attribute the success to
the superior management skills of those in charge of the South Mrica-free
portfolios rather than to restricting investments in South Mrica.
Using PENDAT data from the early 1990s, the analysis presented earlier in
this paper shows no significant effect on returns of restrictions on investing
in South Mrica. Thus, taking the pre-1993 period as a whole, while theory
would suggest that the South Mrica divestiture would reduce returns, spe-
cial circumstances produced neutral to positive results.
Tobacco. In contrast to the pervasiveness of businesses involved in South
Mrica, tobacco companies constituted less than 2 percent of the holdings
of state and local plans even before any divestiture. Therefore, any finan-
cial effect of divestiture should be quite small. Indeed, over the ten-year
period 1986-96, the S&P 500 including tobacco stocks showed a return
only 16 basis points higher on an annual basis than the S&P 500 without
tobacco stocks. The S&P 500 data also suggests that the risk-return trade-
off· has worsened in the 1990s. For the five-year period 1991-96, the S&P
50Q portfolio including tobacco stock had 15 basis points lower return on
an annual basis and a higher coefficient variation than the portfolio exclud-
ing tobacco stock (Hemmerick 1997). This trend has continued and recent
data show that for the five-year period ending February 1999, every major
tobacco stock underperformed the S&P 500 on a risk-adjusted basis (So-
cial Investment Forum 1999). This decline in risk-adjusted return provides
a justification for selling tobacco stock for financial rather than social con-
siderations.28
To conclude, divestiture policies do not seem to have affected public pen-
sion plans to any great extent.29 The widespread divestiture of investments
with South Mrica ties during the 1980s was a unique event. Divestiture of
South Mrica assets was not limited to public pension plans but reflected
a polky supported worldwide to impose economic sanctions against South
Africa. Recent experience with tobacco indicate that most public pension
plans continue to hold tobacco stocks and argue that investment policies
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should be based on risk and return considerations, rather than on social
arguments.
Pensions as a Safety Valve
The final way in which politics could enter into plan performance arises if
states and localities turn to their pension funds in times of fiscal distress.
Public pensions are regulated by states, with state law setting investment
policies as well as rules for the composition of the pension board. Pension
boards usually consist of a combination of members elected by the plans'
participants, members appointed by the state, and members named ex offi-
cio (for example, the state treasurer or comptroller) (Romano 1993). The
role of the state in the regulation ofpension plans and the presence ofpoliti-
cal officials on pension boards can create a conflict of interest between states
and plan participants. In particular, states may see pension plans as a source
of revenue in times of fiscal stress and be tempted to use pension funds to
cover shortfalls in their budgets (Hushbeck 1993).
It has been very uncommon for states directly to transfer money intended
for pension contributions to the general budget, so that states would fail
to make their legally required pension contributions (Hushbeck 1993). In
the cases where states have turned to pension plans, it has been more com-
mon to change actuarial assumptions in order to reduce the states' required
contributions to the plan. Changing assumptions can free up funds but still
allow the state to make its required contribution to the pension fund. How-
ever, not every change in assumptions is an attempt to reduce contributions;
in many cases, changes are justified by improved economic conditions, in-
creased rate of return, or changes in the funds' asset mix.
Use of Pension Funds in State Budgets
The financial health of public pension plans improved dramatically dur-
ing the 1980s. They adopted actuarially sound funding methods, benefited
from increased contributions to their funds, and were subject to improved
oversight. These changes and higher investment returns during the 1980s,
helped improve funding. In 1993, the median plan's stock funding ratio had
risen to 97 percent and the mean ratio was 95 percent (Mitchell and Carr
1996).30
By contrast, many states faced severe budget deficits in the early 1990s.
Given the improved financial status of pension funds, a few state govern-
ments did in fact turn to their public plans for assistance.3l One publicized
case occurred in California, where the state faced a $14.3 billion budget defi-
cit in 1991. The legislature allowed the state to reduce its required pension
contributions to CalPERS by $1.6 billion to help reduce the budget shortfall,
an amount representing 2.4 percent of total assets and equal to what the sys-
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tem had earned in excess of projected earnings for the year (Durgin 1991).32
This was the first time any state government actually used money for general
budgetary purposes from funds earmarked for the pension system. CaIP-
ERS lost its suit in state court and the money was transferred to the general
budget. California again failed to make the full required pension contribu-
tions in 1992 and 1993 (Vrana 1997). Fund administrators again filed suit in
1994 to stop the practice, and eventually, in 1997, the California Supreme
Court ruled that workers had a right to an actuarial sound pension system,
and ordered the state to pay back the money to the pension system. The
funds were paid back in full during the 1997-98 fiscal year (Hushbeck 1993;
Romano 1993; Gunnison 1997; Walsh 1997; Walters 1997).33
The direct use of pension funds, as occurred in California, proves to be a
rare occurrence in the history ofD. S. public pension plans. In times offiscal
stress, it has been more common for states to use indirect methods to free up
funds. Instead of reducing already committed contributions to the pension
system, states have sometimes changed actuarial methods or assumptions to
reduce required contributions. For example, the real discount rate of pen-
sion obligations is determined by the difference (the spread) between the
assumed rate of return and the rate of assumed wage growth. The higher
the discount rate, the lower future pension obligations will be, reducing the
state's required contributions to the pension fund.
Many pension systems have changed their interest rate assumptions over
time, but the evidence suggests that most of these changes can be justified
on economic grounds.34 For example, Mitchell and Smith (1994) examined
the spread for public pension plans over the 1980s, and found a mean spread
of 2 percent, a number close to the historic real interest rate. Based on
this, they concluded that state governments had not strategically altered the
spread to lower required contributions. Dulebohn (1995) reached a similar
conclusion in the early 1990s.
In practice, it can be difficult to distinguish between what is actuarially
correct, and what is done to help state budgets.35 Even though the survey
evidence does not indicate widespread manipulation of actuarial assump-
tions, a few states have clearly changed actuarial assumptions or account-
ing methods to cover budget deficits.36 As one example, Governor Cuomo
of New York argued that public pension assets should be considered one
tool among many to deal with the needs of the state. In 1990, the state
switched accounting methods creating a surplus for the pension fund and
reducing the state's required contribution to zero (Hemmerick and Schwim-
mer 1992). In response, the pension system filed suit. A state court ruled that
the proposed change would divert pension funds to cover current budget
deficits and ruled it illegal in 1993. At that point, the state was ordered to pay
back $403 million, an amount equal to what would have been contributed
under the old accounting scheme (Sorenson 1995).
New Jersey also changed accounting methods in 1992, to increase the
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value of the public pension fund, which reduced that year's required con-
tributions by $773 million. Since required contributions based on the old
accounting method had already been deposited into the pension system,
and using the new accounting method the state had contributed $773 mil-
lion more than required, the state transferred the "excess" amount from
the pension system to the state treasury. A similar bookkeeping change was
made in 1994, reducing required contributions by $180 million, with the
total adjustment representing approximately 2 percent of assets. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) launched an inquiry into these transfers arguing
that once money was paid into the pension system any removal of money was
prohibited. The state counterclaimed that it had the right to recover contri-
butions made in excess of required contributions the same year they were
made. Before the case went to court, an agreement was reached in which
the state agreed to pay back the money in form of excess contributions over
several years (Pulley 1996).
As a final example of politics influencing public pension finance, in a few
instances plans have agreed to come to the assistance of a state or local gov-
ernment.When Philadelphia was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1991, the city
obtained a short-term loan' of$140 million from the state's well-funded pub-
lic school employees retirement system. The money was paid back quickly
and with interest without threatening the financial status of the pension plan
(Eithelberg 1991).
To conclude, states have occasionally tried to use pension funds as a
source of revenue in times of fiscal pressure. However, in a few instances of
obvious misuse of funds, that state courts have protected participants and
ordered the payment reinstated. Although states sometimes have changed
actuarial assumptions to free up funds, studies prove no evidence ofsystem-
atic misuse of assumptions. Further, funding ratios have not been reduced;
the PENDAT data from 1991-97 indicates that the mean funding ratio has
consistently been around 95 percent.
Conclusions
Our exploration ofpublic pension investment policy highlights - despite re-
ports of widespread economic targeting and screening (Franco, Rappaport,
and Storey 1999)-the limited extent to which social or political consider-
ations affect the performance of state and local pension funds. Economi-
cally targeted investing, which caused such a stir in the 1980s, accounts for
no more than 2.5 percent of total state and local portfolios, and does not
appear to hurt investment performance. In terms of shareholder activism,
very little activity is going on, and the little that is going on is more likely to
help than hurt pension fund performance. In terms of divestiture, public
plans generally resist selling stocks for political purposes and try to exhaust
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all avenues of compromise before taking such an action. Finally, the evi-
dence ofstates trying to use pensions as a safety valve indicates that affected
parties will sue, and the courts will protect the rights of participants.
In our view, it is particularly remarkable that so little social investing has
taken place at the state and local level given that many of these public plans
lack the federal protections afforded corporate pension plans and those en-
visioned for possible social security equity investment (see Aaron and Reis-
chauer 1998; Advisory Council on Social Security Reform 1996; Ball 1998;
and Munnell and Balduzzi 1998). First, little attempt is made to keep poli-
ticians away from public plans; in fact, many plans have the state treasurer
and other elected officials sitting on the pension board. In the case ofSocial
Security Trust Fund investments, Congress would be expected to establish
an expert investment board, similar to the Federal Reserve Board or the
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board that administers the federal
employee Thrift Savings Plan. To insulate such a board from political influ-
ence, members would be appointed for long and staggered terms. Second,
many state and local plans are still managed in-house where state employ-
ees select individual stocks. In contrast, for social security investments, the
board would be required to select a broad index fund, such as the Russell
3,000 or the Wilshire 5,000, and it would have to hire private sector money
managers on a competitive basis. We believe that such safeguards would pre-
vent even the modest amount of social investing that we found at the state
and local level.
One final note, regarding a factor that was not investigated but rather
taken for granted throughout this study-namely, the ability of a govern-
ment entity to contribute to national saving. Some critics argue that it is
not possible for the government to accumulate reserves; they claim that any
buildup will be dissipated in the form of higher benefits or used to justify a
tax cut. But state and .local governments have really accumulated reserves
to fund their pension obligations; they have not given the funds away in the
form of higher benefits; their plans are now roughly 95 percent funded. Nor
have they used the large surpluses in their pension accounts tojustify deficits
in their operating budgets. Their nonretirement budget balance has fluc-
tuated around zero, while annual surpluses in their retirement funds have
averaged roughly 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Thus, states
appear to be adding to national saving through the accumulation of pension
reserves. If it can be done at the state level, it certainly should be possible
at the federal level.
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ApPENDIX TABLE 1. Multivariate Analysis of Rate of Return of State and Local Pension Plans ETI Activity Measured as an Indicator Variable
1991 1993 1995 1997 Pooled
ROR90 RORAVG ROR92 RORAVG ROR94 RORAVG ROR96 RORAVG RORCUR RORAVG
Management strategies
HINSTATE -1.94 1.29 -0.56 0.39 -0.59 0.20 0.90 0.02 -0.55 0.60
(1.61 ) (0.83) (0.82) (0.61) (1.17) (0.42) (1.18) (0.64) (0.56) (0.46)
RESTRICT 1.21 1.16** 0.68 0.89** 0.10 0.48* -0.66 -0.19 0.53 0.59*
(1.00) (0.54) (0.50) (0.40) (0.79) (0.27) (0.62) (0.35) (0.37) (0.23)
SOUTH AFRICA -0.69 0.21 -0.91 ** 0.16 -0.53 -0.46 1.09 0.38 -0.45 0.00
(0.81) (0.43) (0.43) (0.36) (0.82) (0.29) (0.67) (0.38) (0.35) (0.20)
Portfolio composition and size
EQUITY% 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.03** -0.05** 0.01 0.16* 0.07** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.01 )
SIZE -0.05 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.22** 0.12** 0.01 0.06*
(0.18) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03)
Management and reporting practices
OUTEVAL -2.33** -0.10 1.34** -0.16 -1.20 0.11 -2.75** -0.94* -0.87* -0.04
(1.03) (0.58) (0.60) (0.56) (1.02) (0.34) (0.83) (0.51) (0.48) (0.26)
ADINVST -0.66 -0.95** 0.28 0.23 -0.88 -0.15 0.02 -0.11 -0.16 -0.19
(0.81 ) (0.43) (0.43) (0.35) (0.66) (0.22) (0.45) (0.25) (0.29) (0.16)
PROXY - - - - - - -0.31 -0.32
(0.58) (0.32)
Board composition
ELCTMEMB -0.03* -0.02** -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01 ) (0.00)
Year
YEAR91 -5.35** 0.60**
(0.57) (0.27)
YEAR93 -4.11 ** -0.14
(0.42) (0.23)
YEAR95 -12.13** -2.48**
(0.43) (0.17)
CONSTANT 11.46** 10.84** 10.77** 10.17** 4.57 7.01 ** 2.95 5.83** 12.84** 8.74**
(3.62) (1.92) (1.84) (2.02) (3.00) (1.14) (2.04) (1.14) (1.44) (0.83)
R2 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.50 0.40 0.55 0.30
Number of Observations 155 132 220 123 144 120 166 156 698 543
Source: Authors' calculations using PENDAT (see Zorn 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997).
"Size" variable is measured as the natural log of assets. Standard errors in parentheses. HINSTATE is an indicator variable for ETI activity.
**Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level.
For variable definitions see Table 2.
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ApPENDIX TABLE 2. Multivariate Analysis of Rate of Retum of State and Local
Pension Plans ETI Activity Derived from Boice Dunham
Group
1993
ROR92 RORAVG
Management strategies
GOLDMAN -1.06 0.15
(0.83) (0.59)
RESTRICT 0.71 0.89**
(0.49) (0.40)
SOUTH AFRICA -0.91 ** 0.15
(0.43) (0.36)
Portfolio composition and size
EQUI1Y% -0.01 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
SIZE -0.06 0.03
(0.10) (0.08)
Management and reporting practices
OUTEVAL 1.27** -0.02
(0.59) (0.54)
ADINVST 0.36 0.27
(0.44) (0.35)
Board composition
ELCTMEMB -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
CONSTANT 10.05** 9.85**
(1.88) (1.61)
R2 0.07 0.09
Number of Observations 223 126
Source: Authors' calculations using Boice Dunham Group (1993) and PENDAT (see Zorn
1993). GOLDMAN is an indicator variable for ETI activity derived from Boice Dunham Group
(1993).
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level.
For variable definitions see Table 2.
ApPENDIX TABLE 3. State Investment Prohibition Laws
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Delaware
Policy
None
None
None
None
General prohibition of investment in firms furthering or
complying with Arab League boycott of Israel.
On or after January 1, 1994, state trust moneys shall
not be used to make additional or new investments in
business firms that engage in discriminatory business
practices in furtherance of or in compliance with the
Arab League's economic boycott of Israel.
None
Urge companies to follow MacBride principles. Begin-
ning in 1987, divest all holdings in Northern Ireland and
invest no new funds unless such corporations have
implemented the MacBride principles.
No investment in Iran.
Any assets of the funds invested after March 16, 1993,
in stocks, securities, or other obligations of any insti-
tution or company doing business in or with Northern
Ireland shall be invested to reflect advances to elimi-
nate discrimination made by these institutions and
companies, pursuant to the MacBride principles.
None
Source
Code of Alabama
Code of Alaska
Code of Arizona
Code of Arkansas
California Government Code §16649.81 (1999)
California Government Code§ 16649.81 (1999)
Code of Colorado
Connecticut General Statute §13-13h (1997)
Connecticut General Statute §3-13g (1997)
D.C. Code §1-721 (1998)
Code of Delaware
ApPENDIX TABLE 3. Continued
State
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Policy
Any moneys or assets of the System Trust Fund, which
shall remain or be invested on and after October 1,
1988, in the stocks, securities, or other obligations of
any institution or company doing business in or with
Northern Ireland, or with agencies or instrumentalities
thereof, shall be invested subject to the provisions of
Mac Bride principles.
The State Board of Administration shall divest any in-
vestment and is prohibited from investment in stocks,
securities, or other obligations of any institution or
company doing business in or with Cuba.
None
None
None
None
None
None
None -
None
None
The treasurer of state and the Board of Trustees shall
review the extent to which U.S. corporations or their
subsidiaries doing business in Northern Ireland, in which
the assets of any state pension or annuity fund are
invested, adhere to the MacBride principles.
None
Source
Florida Statute §121.l53 (1998)
Florida Statute §215.471 (1998)
Code of Georgia
Code of Hawaii
Code of Idaho
Code of Illinois
Code of Indiana
Code of Iowa
Code of Kansas
Code of Kentucky
Code of Louisiana
Maine Revised Statutes §1955 (1997)
Code of Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
No funds shall be invested in any bank or financial insti-
tution which has outstanding loans to any individual
or corporation engaged in the manufacture, distribu-
tion or sale of firearms, munitions, including rubber
or plastic bullets, tear gas, armored vehicles or mili-
tary aircraft for use or deployment in any activity in
Narthern Ireland, and no assets shall be invested in
the stocks, securities or other obligations of any such
company so engaged.
No new investment of funds shall be made in stocks,
securities or other obligations of any company that
derives more than 15 percent of its revenues from the
sale of tobacco products.
None
Whenever feasible, the board shall sponsor, cosponsor,
or support shareholder resolutions designed to en-
courage corporations in which the board has invested
to pursue a policy of affirmative action in Northern
Ireland.
None
Whenever feasible, the state treasurer shall sponsor, co-
sponsor or support shareholder resolutions designed
to encourage the bank, financial institution or other
corporation in which the state treasurer or other state
agency has invested state funds to pursue a policy of
affirmative action in Narthern Ireland.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the
state treasurer or any other state agency to dispose of
existing investments or to make future investments
that violate sound investment policy.
None
Massachusetts Annotated Laws Ch. 15A, §40 (1999)
Massachusetts Annotated Laws Ch. 32, §23 (1999)
Code of Michigan
Minnesota Statutes §llA.241 (1998)
Code of Mississippi
§30.720 Revised Statutes of Missouri (1997)
Code of Montana
ApPENDIX TABLE 3. Continued
State
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
NewJersey
New Mexico
New York
Policy
With respect to corporations doing business in Northern
Ireland, the state investment officer shall, consistent
with the MacBride principles, invest in corporate
stocks or obligations in a manner to encourage corpo-
rations that in the state investment officer's determi-
nation pursue a policy of affirmative action in Northern
Ireland.
None
Whenever feasible, the treasurer shall sponsor, cospon-
sor or support shareholder resolutions designed to
encourage corporations doing business in Northern Ire-
land in which the treasurer has invested to adopt and
implement the MacBride principles.
Consistent with sound investment policy and prudent
fiduciary standards, the treasurer shall, with respect to
state funds available for future investment in corpo-
rations doing business in Northern Ireland, invest such
funds in corporations conducting their operations
in Northern Ireland in accordance with the MacBride
principles and fair employment practices.
No~ •
Consistent with sound investment policy, the comp-
troller shall invest the assets of the common retirement
fund in such a manner that the investments in insti-
tutions doing business in or with Northern Ireland shall
reflect the advances made by such institutions in elimi-
nating discrimination as established pursuant to the
MacBride principles.
Source
Revised Statutes of Nebraska §72-1246.07 (1998)
Code of Nevada
Revised Statutes Annotated 6:33 (1999)
Revised Statutes Annotated 6:34 (1999)
Code of New Mexico
New York Consolidated Law Services Retirement &
Social Security S §423-a (1998)
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
None
None
None
None
None
Consistent with sound investment policy, the board shall
invest the assets of the fund in such a manner that
the investments in institutions doing business in or
with Northern Ireland shall reflect the advances made
by the institutions in eliminating discrimination as
established pursuant to the MacBride principles.
The general treasurer, in accordance with sound invest-
ment criteria, is encouraged to make future pension
fund investments in U.S. firms which conduct business
in Northern Ireland and which abide by the MacBride
Principles offair employment.
None
None
None
The comptroller may not use state funds to invest in
or purchase obligations of a private corporation or
other private business entity doing business in Northern
Ireland unless the corporation or other entity (1) ad-
heres to fair employment practices and (2) does not
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or disability.
None
None
None
None
None
Code of North Carolina
Code of North Dakota
Code of Ohio
Code of Oklahoma
Code of Oregon
Title 24 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes § 8527
(1998)
Rhode Island General Laws §35-10n-14 (1998)
Code of South Carolina
Code of South Dakota
Code of Tennessee
Texas Government Code §404.024 (1999)
Code of Utah
Code of Vermont
Code of Virginia
Code of Washington
Code of West Virginia
ApPENDIX TABLE 3. Continued
State
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Policy
None
None
Source
Code of Wisconsin
Code of Wyoming
Source: Derived by authors from state laws.
The MacBride Principles are used to determine the existence of affirmative action taken by institutions or companies doing business in Northern Ireland to elimi-
nate ethnic or religious discrimination based on actions taken for: (1) increasing the representation of individuals from underrepresented religious groups in the
work force, including managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical anQ technical jobs; (2) providing adequate security for the protection of minority employ-
ees, both at the workplace and while traveling to and from work; (3) the banning of provocative religious or political emblems from the workplace; (4) publicly
advertising all job openings and making special recruitment efforts to attract applicants from underrepresented religious groups; (5) providing that layoff, recall
and termination procedures should not in practice favor particular religious groupings; (6) the abolition ofjob reservations, apprenticeship restrictions and dif-
ferential employment criteria which discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic origin; (7) the development of training programs that wiIl prepare substantial
numbers of current minority employees for skilled jobs, including the expansion of existing programs and the creation of new programs to train, upgrade and
improve the skiIls of minority employees; (8) the establishment of procedures to assess, identify and actively recruit minority employees with potential for further
advancement; and (9) the appointment of senior management staff members to oversee affirmative action efforts and the setting up of timetables to carry out
affirmative action principles.
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Notes
1. The compendium, which supports targeted investing, was designed as "the first
step in the creation and analysis of a detailed database that pension fund trustees,
public officials, pension consultants, and others can use when considering ETI pro-
grams and evaluating their appropriateness for funds" (p. 1).
2. A similar view ofETIs is expressed by U.S. Department of Labor (1992) and Wat-
son (1994). Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were established originally by the federal
government to ensure that affordable mortgages are available to low- and middle-
income households. To increase the supply of mortgage funds, Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae buy mortgages in the secondary market and sell them as securities to
investors thereby freeing up more funds for mortgage lending. Both entities are now
owned by private investors.
3. Boice Dunham Group surveyed the 50 state public employee retirement funds
(representing $535.7 billion of assets) and the 54 largest other public employee re-
tirement funds (representing $318.9 billion ofassets), 6 ofwhich (representing $30.3
billion ofassets) refused to participate. The participating funds with $887.3 billion of
assets represented about 73 percent of estimated total state and local pension fund
financial assets as ofJune 1993 ($1167.6 billion as of end of 1992 and $1255.9 billion
as of end of 1993 suggests about $1211.8 billion as of mid-year).
4. The survey asked in various years: "What percentage of the portfolio is directed
in-state for developmental purposes? (1991 and 1993)" "What percent of the port-
folio is targeted in-state? (1995)" "Is a portion of the portfolio targeted or directed
in-state for economic development purposes? If yes, what percentage of your port-
folio is targeted in-state? (1997)"
5. In addition to the comprehensive surveys reported above, partial surveys yield
similar results. For example, a 1996 report on the twenty largest public plans showed
that ETIs accounted for 2.9 percent oftotal holdings. Given that large plans are more
likely than small ones to engage in ETI activities, this survey is fully consistent with
those reported for the nation as a whole (Spencer's Research Reports 1997).
6. Nofsinger (1998) and Romano (1993) both included a variable for the percent-
age of the board elected by fund members, but they did so for opposite reasons and
expected coefficients of opposite signs. Romano's hypothesis was that board mem-
bers who are elected by fund members, as opposed to appointed or ex officio, are not
political and therefore would not be pressured or lured into ETI activity. Romano ex-
pected and found a positive relationship between elected board members and rate
of return. Nofsinger included the identical variable to represent agency costs result-
ing from organizational inefficiency, in that beneficiaries will not take account of the
burden they are imposing on future tax payers if ETIs have a negative impact on re-
turns. He anticipated and found a negative (but generally not statistically significant)
coefficient.
. 7. In 1991, ETI activity appears to have a significant positive effect on rate of re-
turn, but this is not consistent with either theory or results for later years. It can only
be regarded as an anomaly.
8. GAO (1995) conclusions are consistent with the findings reported in this paper,
but they cannot be used as supporting evidence since the agency examined only
seven plans that had a history of success in ETI investing and therefore were not
representative. GAO found that the returns for the ETIs promoting business devel-
opment were generally similar to the returns of benchmark investments. The only
exception was that the performance ofETI venture capital (3.2 percent of total ETI
activity) sometimes appeared to lag the comparison investments.
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9. At first glance, Table 3 in the Romano article gives the reader a very different
impression about the success of the empirical analysis because the author uses a
one-tailed rather than a two-tailed test to evaluate statistical significance.
10. Even though this study provides little support for the contention that state and
local pension plans sacrifice large returns for social objectives, critics ofgovernment
investment have repeatedly mischaracterized the results. For example, the original
text read "The results imply that 10% more in-state investments are associated with a
1% drop in return" (p. 109). Based on this statement a 1995Joint Economic Commit-
tee Economic Update "The Economics of ETIs: Sacrificing Returns for Political Goals"
claimed that ''After controlling for differences in size and type of investment, she
[Olivia Mitchell] concluded that ETIs were associated with an average 2 percentage
point reduction in investment returns." In a September 18, 1995 letter to the Com-
mittee, Mitchell clarified that theJEC Economic Update had misinterpreted her results.
She wrote, "The reported coefficient was quite small: -0.08. To gauge the magnitude
of this estimate, suppose we hypothesize that the fraction of in-state holding in state
and local pension plans were to grow to 150 percent of their 1990 level, holding all
else constant including risk. The predicted effect on returns would be a decline of
0.17 of 1 percentage point -17 basis points, and not the figure of 200 basis points
your press release proposes." Similarly, Alan Greenspan (1999) appears to be refer-
ring to this article when he says "it has been shown that state pension plans that
are required to direct a portion of their investments in-state and those that make
'economically targeted investments' experience lower returns as a result."
11. One problem with the PENDAT data is the large number of missing values on
key variables, which means that without imputation many plans must be dropped
from the analysis. Diligent researchers try to avoid eliminating a large number of
observations by making educated guesses about what the missing information might
be. If those are not well documented, however, it is difficult to d}lplicate the results.
12. Our analysis indicates that the author may have omitted the 7 largest systems,
including California, New York, Texas, and Florida; and the reduced sample has a
much higher percentage of systems with ETIs than in the original survey.
13. Results are available from the authors upon request.
14. For example, CalPERS and the Council of Institutional Investors, an umbrella
organization for large institutional investors, regularly identify a handful of poorly
performing firms.
15. The exception is a recent bylaw amendment calling for repealing a poison pill,
which, if passed, is binding rather than advisory. The poison pill, created in the early
1980s, is a provision adopted by a number of companies to avoid hostile takeovers.
Although the details of the provosions differ by company, one common technique
is to issue large numbers of shares to existing shareholders. This tactic increases the
price of the company by forcing the buyer to purchase the perferred stock as well
as the common stock of the company. Critics have attacked the poison pill bylaw,
saying that it improperly interferes with ability of the management and board of di-
rectors to run the company. Since the poison pill plays so prominently in the ability
of companies to ward off hostile takeovers, the future of the poison pill bylaw is un-
certain.
16. One reason why fund managers spend relatively little on shareholder activism
may be that they generally do not want to hurt their returns relative to their peers
nor allow their peers to free ride on their efforts.
17. The activity was a response to developments in the corporate control market
(Pound 1992). In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically changed the structure
of takeover laws prevailing at the time, by effectively invalidating the restrictive take-
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over laws in thirty-seven states. Without any statutory protection against hostile out-
side takeovers, many managers sought new anti-takeover defenses. In the year fol-
lowing the Court decision, 206 firms adopted antitakeover amendments compared
to 22 in the previous year. The adoption ofpoison pills and state antitakeover legisla-
tion accelerated in 1985 after the Delaware Supreme Court and others upheld their
use as an antitakeover device. By the late 1980s, poison pills and restrictive state laws
posed a formidable obstacle to hostile takeover activity, and hostile takeover activity
virtually ceased by 1990. Since the traditional mechanism for replacing management
were not functioning effectively, many institutional investors sought to affect firm
policies through the use of shareholder initiatives and proxy fights with incumbent
managers.
18. Much of the following discussion reflects an excellent survey of the empirical
literature by Black (1998).
19. 1997 was the first year that the corporate activism question was included in
the survey. The question was framed as follows: "Has your system actively partici-
pated in corporate governance issues by voting against management on annual proxy
statements or otherwise encouraging companies you hold stock in to change their
management activities?"
20. For example, Daily, Johnson, Elstrand, and Dalton (1996) fail to find to find
any relationship between shareholder activism and firm performance.
21. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and Smith (1996) find significant negative re-
sponse to proposals to eliminate a takeover defense. Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner
(1996) and Wahal (1996) find significant positive returns to successful "jawboning."
Smith finds significant positive returns (1.1 percent) to companies acceding to Calp-
ers proposals, but significant negative returns (1.2 percent) to companies that resist.
22. For example, Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) find no correlation be-
tween activism and subsequent CEO turnover.
23. Pension funds do not coordinate their activism; in fact, they try not to target
the same company in the same year. When asked why, they often cite a regulatory
barrier-shareholders who act together on a voting issue and together own more
than 5 percent of a company's shares must file with the SEC and risk a lawsuit by
the company and other shareholders (Black 1998). But a SEC filing is not an insur-
mountable hurdle and companies rarely sue major institutional investors. It may be
that most activist investors are trying to change the corporate culture as much as
to improve the returns to anyone firm, so spreading their interventions gives them
maximum leverage.
24. The only other countries cited are the Arab League, Iran, and Cuba. Califor-
nia prohibits investment in firms furthering or complying with the Arab League boy-
cott of Israel, Connecticut bars investment in Iran, and Florida prohibits investments
in companies doing business with Cuba.
25. The City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, divested its tobacco stock in 1990, but
no other divestment activity occurred until 1996 (Investor Responsibility Research
Center 1997a).
26. The ban was signed into law in 1997 giving the public pension system three
years to divest its tobacco holdings, which constituted about 1 percent of the over-
all portfolio. However, the public pension plans sold their tobacco holdings within
3 months (Investor Responsibility Research Center 1998a).
27. The divestment bill in California has not been approved by the legislature.
28. The perceived riskiness of tobacco investment was further evidenced by a re-
cent move by RJR Nabisco, in which the company separated tobacco production
from its food production.
190 Alicia H. Munnell and Annika Sunden
29. Aside from tobacco, the only other divestiture activity in recent years occurred
in Texas. Texas tried to ban investments in companies that produce music that glam-
orizes violence and denigrates women, but the ban was ruled unconstitutional. In
addition, the Texas Permanent School Fund has decided to sell its holding of Disney
stock, citing an ethical stand against Disney's depiction of sex, drugs, and violence
in some movie productions (Guy 1998).
30. The funding ratio is measured by the ratio of accrued pension liabilities to the
funds assets. However, plans use different actuarial assumptions to calculate their
accrued liabilities. In order to compare funding ratios across plans, the Government
Accounting Standards Board in 1987 required plans to report their liabilities using
a standardized method, the stock funding method. This requirement was withdrawn
in 1994, again making it difficult to compare funding ratios (Zorn 1997).
31. An early instance ofmisuse ofpension funds took place in New York in the mid
1970s when the state pension plan bought bonds offour financially distressed agen-
cies to avoid the state diverting contributions intended for the pension plan. The
state and city pension plans also bought city bonds worth $125 million when New
York City was on the verge of insolvency. A state court originally ruled against the
action, but the purchase was made possible through legislation passed by the New
York State legislature and Congress (Romano 1993; Eaton and Nofsinger 1999). The
city of Detroit also used pension funds to bail itself out in the early 1980s (Franco,
Rappaport, and Storey 1999).
32. At the same time, the actuarial function for the pension system was transferred
from CaIPERS' board to an actuary appointed by the governor. The governor also
tried to change the board composition so that political appointees would be in the
majority rather than members elected by the plan participants; this move failed.
However, in 1992 California approved a state constitutional amendment intended to
protect public pension funds from similar incidents and the actuarial function was
returned to the pension system (Romano 1993).
33. On a much smaller scale, but similar to California, Illinois transferred $21mil-
lion (less than 1 percent of total funds) to the general budget in 1991. In response,
the pension participants filed suit and the Illinois Supreme Court barred the transfer
temporarily but lifted the block (Vosti 1991; Wheeler 1992).
34. Interest assumptions were raised in the early 1990s in Connecticut, New York,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Vermont (Eitelberg 1991).
35. Prudent pension fund management requires regular review of the validity of
assumptions, and most plans follow this practice decreasing the risk that changes in
actuarial methods are used to divert pension contributions (Hushbeck 1993).
36. Maine changed actuarial assumptions in 1993 but a federal court ruled the
changes unconstitutional after participants filed suit (Naese 1996). In 1991,Texas
reduced contribution from 7.6 percent of earnings to 6 percent of earnings, de-
creasing the state's required contribution by $422 million over two years (Hushbeck
1993).
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